All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror

Every Iranian New Year, we'd drive through Abadan, and I'd watch the flames shooting from the tops of those massive stacks—the oil refinery burning off excess natural gas like some kind of industrial volcano. The infrastructure stretched for acres, a sprawling testament to British engineering and ambition, built back when Persia was just another piece on the colonial chessboard. I didn't understand then what I was really looking at: the physical manifestation of why Iran doesn't trust us. Any of us. Since living in Iran, I've been fascinated—maybe obsessed is more accurate—with the role foreign governments and companies have played in the Middle East, particularly in the petroleum industry. It's one thing to read about resource extraction and geopolitical maneuvering in a textbook. It's another thing entirely to live in a country where the national memory is scarred by it. Stephen Kinzer's All the Shah's Men is the book I wish I'd read before I ever set foot in Iran. Hell, it's the book I wish every American would read before we collectively decide to have opinions about the Middle East. Here's what happens when you live in Iran: you sit around tables with educated, sophisticated people who will, with complete sincerity, spin conspiracy theories that sound absolutely bananas to Western ears. And I used to find it funny, this cultural tendency toward seeing plots within plots, secret hands pulling strings behind every curtain. Then I read Ryan Holiday's Conspiracy, which chronicles how Peter Thiel quietly, methodically, and very successfully destroyed Gawker because they outed him as gay against his will. Turns out conspiracy theories aren't quite so ridiculous when you realize that powerful people actually do engineer elaborate, patient, multi-year schemes to achieve their ends. We Americans just aren't used to fearing such things, thanks to our relatively stable history. Iranians, on the other hand, have every reason to believe in conspiracies. Because they've lived through them. Because their popular prime minister—Mohammad Mosadegh, wildly beloved by his people—was actually, genuinely, factually overthrown in a CIA-orchestrated coup in 1953. That's not a theory. That's history. And that's where All the Shah's Men comes in. Kinzer's book does something remarkable: it explains not just what happened, but why it matters. It's not just a recounting of events (though it is that, and brilliantly so). It's a window into the Iranian national psyche, into why a country with such a long, proud history has so little patience for foreign meddling. Iran isn't some backwards outpost that just appeared on the map. It's Persia, for God's sake—one of the world's great civilizations, with a history stretching back millennia. They've watched foreign powers trade in their resources for what amounts to glass beads. They've seen their own corrupt leaders sell them out again and again. They know what happens behind closed doors because it's happened to them. When the British Petroleum's predecessor effectively owned Iran's oil and gave the country a pittance in return, Mosadegh tried to nationalize it. He wanted Iran's oil wealth to benefit Iranians. Radical concept, right? The British didn't much care for that idea, and they convinced the Americans that Mosadegh was a communist threat. So we—the United States of America, land of democracy and freedom—orchestrated a coup to remove a democratically elected leader and install the Shah, who would be far more amenable to Western interests. That moment? That's the nadir of US-Iran relations. That's where the hostilities that eventually led to the 1979 revolution and the hostage crisis actually began. Not with religious extremism appearing out of nowhere, but with us deciding that Iranian democracy was fine as long as it served our purposes. All the Shah's Men is a fabulous read, not just because Kinzer teaches the history of Iran in a clear, concise way—though he does that masterfully—but because he shows you the folly of toying with a nation that has a strong identity and a long memory. He explains what was at stake then and what remains at stake now: access to oil, regional influence, the strategic geography of the Middle East. He makes clear why nations vie for power there and why, despite all evidence to the contrary, we keep making the same mistakes. Most importantly, he illuminates why invading or attempting to control Iran is probably the stupidest thing any foreign power could do. You can't bomb a proud people into submission, and you can't expect them to forget what you've done. What struck me most about the book is how it reveals the chess game happening behind the scenes—the back-channeling, the quiet machinations, the deals struck in rooms the average citizen never sees. We like to think of foreign policy as this noble, principled endeavor. All the Shah's Men shows you the grubby reality: it's often about resources, leverage, and maintaining the upper hand, regardless of the human cost. If you want to understand why the Middle East is the way it is, why Iran views the West with such suspicion, why our attempts at influence so often backfire spectacularly—read this book. If you want to understand how we got here and why our "here" involves so much mutual hostility and mistrust—read this book. And if you just want to read a damn good piece of non-fiction that reads like a thriller but happens to be true—definitely read this book. Because the thing about history is this: if you don't understand it, you're doomed to keep repeating it. And God knows we've repeated this particular pattern enough times already.

Stephen Kinzer tells the story of the coup against Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh and its aftermath, and he tells it very well.

FTC NOTICE: Library Book REVIEW: “All the Shah’s Men” serves as the second book I have read by Stephen Kinzer, and it was full of intrigue, micro-histories, and biographies that left me with the desire to research and read more about the Middle East as well as additional books by this author. It is not unusual for history books to discuss timelines and people; but, what I appreciated most in this text was Kinzer’s differing approach to historical data. He was generous with details about a significant array of people that were involved with multiple coups. There were names of people in his book that I did not recall seeing in other compendiums pertaining to Middle East history and/or Iran. Kinzer shared what their individual philosophies were and how they affected their decisions and the resulting behaviors. One challenge I experienced while reading this book, and that which prevented me from giving it five stars in lieu of four of them, was that there was too much going back and forth in history. A political leader’s history and interactions with others was/were very well described; but, at the end of that history, the reader was then re-introduced to a character at the beginning or middle of the previous history and all within the same chapter. Segmentation via a few extra and short chapters would have helped. Despite the back-and-forth of histories, Stephen Kinzer has a great way of making a reader take a look at a situation and evaluate what could have been done differently. Unfortunately, he waited until over 200 pages into the book for any analysis or extrapolation to occur. This was coupled with a whole series of “if” and “if” and “if-then” and “if.” In doing so, Kinzer inadvertently de-valued what he was trying to accomplish, and the history could no longer be evaluated as a reality. Thankfully I had already read another book called " Reset: Iran, Turkey, and America's Future " by Kinzer, so I knew what he was trying to accomplish, and I didn’t want him to think that this was lost on me. He wanted the reader to imagine how things could have been done differently; what would have happened if one or all of these things did not occur? The author is also quite talented when it comes to creating imagery. He does this thoughtfully, purposely, and respectfully. Kinzer shares the details of his trip to Iran and his visit to Mossadegh’s final home. There are descriptions of colors, flowers, and buildings, and he places them in the context of what they experienced and looked like in history and how they had changed by the time of his visit. There is a certain romanticism about how he goes about interviewing people who were employees, villagers/neighbors, friends and family of Mossadegh. Stephen Kinzer makes it clear that with the Mossadegh name, there is a legacy, and there is a responsibility to keep the name pure. Purity and the instability of relationships were prevalent themes in this book. The intelligence that the American government received was not consistently pure. There were people who wanted to make a name for themselves and leveraged “The Cold War” and its threat of spreading communism as a way to convince an American president that it was time to start supporting the British government in its efforts to take back Iran’s newly-nationalized oil company. Kinzer did a good job of “calling out” these people, namely The Dulles Brothers. There were good people on all sides who had good intentions, and they were coupled with individuals or groups filled with mal-intent, which ultimately led to a surpise coup of Mohammed Reza Shah and the promotion to leadership and ultimate power of and for the Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran. There were well-described changes in alliances that ultimately put the United States in an unsavory position with countries in the Middle East…definitely an unfortunate stance and one that can hopefully be corrected.

To write a good history book like this one an author needs to do well in three separate areas. He needs to research the topic at hand, write a readable account and finally analyze the events. Kinzer performs exceptionally well in all three areas. First, the book is meticulously researched. He discusses appropriate history without going into unnecessary or boring details to give the reader an appropriate context and background leading up to the 1953 coup. He also uses a diverse set of resources which leaves no holes in the story. Second, Kinzer's writing is engaging and at times suspenseful. In fact at the end of many chapters, I was unable to put the book aside and take a break from reading due to the suspense Kinzer created. The story is very easy to follow and the reader needs practically no background to follow the events. This is particularly impressive given the relative short length of the book. My only criticism is that I wished he had summarized the cast of characters in an appendix or in the beginning as many similar books do. Finally, his analysis, while many have called too liberal, is even handed. He makes a leap by implying that 9/11 events may have not happened if it weren't for the 1953 CIA led coup. Of course we will never know for sure. He supports his claims convincingly that the coup led to the eventual 1979 hostage crisis and the anti-American feelings in the Middle East. Liberal bias? The facts speak for themselves. The CIA using American tax payer money to overthrow a popular and democratically elected government. We, in the USA, would not appreciate if foreigners overthrew our government so why have a double standard? Perhaps Mossadegh is being glorified too much and ultimately he would have led Iran towards the wrong path, but the point remains that we will never know thanks to the coup. Kinzer does entertain the possibilities that Mossadegh would have been terrible for Iran and the West so I reject the idea that he has a strong liberal bias. If you, like me, find the "Death to USA" chants and hostage taking barbaric and puzzling, this book will offer you fresh insights and help you understand the roots of these actions. You will become a lot smarter and more knowledgeable about the Middle East after reading it. I highly recommend this book.

All the Shah,a Men is by far the best book I have read in a number of years. It is a must reading for everyone even if not particularly concerned with history or politics. The book reads like a suspenseful intrigue spy novel making it hard to stop reading. As an Egyptian it made it clear why Britain and Fran e got so mad when Egypt,s Naser nationalized the Suez Canal only five years after Mosadeq nationalized the Iranian oil and how succeeding in removing him may ha e emboldened them to militarily attack Egypt. Even more importantly the Book increased my appreciation to President Truman vision and integrity but not so much for Eisenhower. Finally, the fact that Iran was on it's way to Democracy and instead of supporting it the effort was thwarted resulting in the current severe suffering of the Iranian people. I cannot recommend the book more for E vereone

This is an excellent look into the history of Iran and the United States. It will enhance the reader’s ability to intelligently evaluate and form his or her view of current events regarding America’s dealings with Iran.

In August 1953, the democratically elected prime minister of Iran, Mohammed Mossadegh, was overthrown in a clumsy coup d’état orchestrated by the infant Central Intelligence Agency. Veteran journalist Stephen Kinzer expertly tells this outrageous story of subterfuge in “All the Shah’s Men.” For Kinzer the episode is a cautionary tale of western meddling in Middle Eastern political affairs. I’m certain that there is more than one way to interpret the remarkable events of 1953. Mossadegh is the tragic hero of Kinzer’s crisp narrative. He was, in the author’s estimation, “a visionary, a utopian, a millenarian.” Two central beliefs shaped his political consciousness, according to the author: the rule of law and independence from foreign interference. He opposed any attempt to concentrate political power and abhorred the concessions given to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. To Winston Churchill he was “an elderly lunatic bent on wrecking his country and handing it over to the Communists.” I suspect the truth lies somewhere in between. In the early 1950s Mossadegh moved to nationalize the Iranian oil industry, which became something of a sacred cause for his followers. “The Shiite religious tradition blended perfectly with the nationalist passion sweeping through Iran,” Kinzer writes. The British run Anglo-Iranian Oil Company steadfastly refused to make any meaningful concessions to the sweetheart deal the company had struck in the 1920s. Mossadegh was prepared to have his country fall on its sword rather than cave to British economic blackmail. As the British did everything in their power to cripple the Iranian economy, Mossadegh called for “deprivation, self-sacrifice, and loyalty.” Kinzer places responsibility for the 1953 coup squarely on the shoulders of the British, even though it was the Americans that would eventually carry out the deed. “The main responsibility [for the coup] lies with the obtuse neocolonialism that guided the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and with the British government’s willingness to accept it.” Interestingly, Mossadegh saw things much the same way. “My only crime,” he said, “is that I nationalized the Iranian oil industry and removed from this land the network of colonialism and the political and economic influence of the greatest empire on earth.” The Americans weren’t overly interested in the economic consequences of oil nationalization. Rather, they viewed the crisis through the prism of the Cold War. There was genuine angst in Washington that the Soviet-backed Tudeh party would orchestrate a coup to overthrow Mossadegh if they didn’t do so first. Of course, that is a great imponderable, as Kinzer concedes: “The crucial question of whether the American coup was necessary to prevent the Soviets from staging a coup of their own cannot be conclusively answered.” The key point, however, is that the Dulles brothers believed it was true and that decisive action was necessary. What really amazed me was how effective the upstart CIA was in fomenting dissent and orchestrating Mossadegh’s fall. The agency was just a few years old and had no real experience at covert regime change. Yet for as little as $100,000 placed in just the right hands clandestine operatives, led by Teddy Roosevelt’s grandson, Kermit – “The chief hero or villain of the piece” depending on your perspective, according to the author – a popular nationalist regime was replaced with a more pliable, and eventually far more repressive one. Indeed, one might perceive Operation Ajax, the code-name given to the operation, as one of the greatest in the CIA’s history. Kinzer certainly doesn’t see it that way. On the contrary, it was very nearly the worst of all outcomes. “Only a Soviet takeover followed by war between the super-powers would have been worse,” he writes. Why? In his view, “It is not far-fetched to draw a line from Operation Ajax through the Shah’s repressive regime and the Islamic Revolution to the fireballs that engulfed the World Trade Center in New York.” The blowback from the ouster of Mossadegh may have been slow in coming, but it’s been with us now for over thirty years. The operation sent all the wrong signals, according to Kinzer. “Operation Ajax taught tyrants and aspiring tyrants [in the Middle East] that the world’s most powerful governments were willing to tolerate limitless oppression as long as oppressive regimes were friendly to the West and to Western oil companies.” Mossadegh’s legacy in his homeland remains sticky. On the one hand, he is a revered nationalist hero. Shortly after the Islamic Revolution of 1979 the main boulevard in downtown Tehran was renamed in his honor. On the other hand, there is much about Mossadegh that the mullahs governing Iran today are unsettled by. “Mossadegh’s secularism was as abhorrent to the new regime as his democratic vision had been to the old one.”

There have been few more fitting epigraphs for a book than the subject one, which is a quote from Harry Truman; Kinzer uses to commence his book. This is a historical work of the first order of importance for every American, and indeed, the vast, overwhelming majority of them know absolutely nothing about this sad, even infuriating chapter of our history. It is hardly "uplifting," and somehow I suspect the movie rights will never be sold. Stephen Kinzer has written a detailed account of the 1953 coup, orchestrated by the CIA, which overthrew the democratically elected government of Iran, headed by Mohammed Mossadegh. Some famous American names were involved. The coup was conceived, planned, and managed by Kermit Roosevelt, the grandson of Teddy. Norman Schwarzkopf Sr., father of the First Gulf War American commander, was the "bag man" for the coup, literally carrying into Iran millions of dollars to pay off certain leaders and to fund rioters that would help undermine the legitimate government of Iran. Why? In some ways one can blame that then fading colonial power, Britain. "Their" oil reserves were in Iran, and they were determined to maintain control of the oil fields, and grant the Iranians only the "crumbs" from the table. The British government had tried to enlist the support of the Americans earlier, to depose Mossadegh and impose a much more pliable leader, in the "best" colonial traditions. Much to his credit, President Truman consistently refused. But when Eisenhower won the election in 1952, the green light was given. The President himself was not so directly involved, but it was the Dulles brothers, at State and the CIA, who provided the essential support for the concept and its execution. The British were clever enough to change their pitch, away from protecting "our" oil, towards the classic bogeyman of the period, the fear of the Communists. Publisher's Weekly says that Kinzer's style is "breezy," and I would agree. It made me a bit uneasy, since it seemed to lack the gravitas of, say, Fromkin's "A Peace to End All Peace." Yet I could not find an error, or even a statement I would quibble with. I read all the 1 and 2-star reviews, none claimed a factual error, reserving their criticism to: "this is a liberal account," (as though use of the "l" word is a sufficient rebuttal) or "blame America guilt trip" (well, maybe we should be blamed), and perhaps the most detailed claims that Mossadegh was not a saint, and Kinzer would certainly agree, detailing many of his faults. One of those "faults" was a rigid determination that the British leave his country, "faults" shared by Washington, Jefferson, Adams, and a few others. His last chapter underscored what a crucial turning point this was in America's and the world's history. It moved America away from Truman's position of sympathy with the masses in developing countries vis-à-vis the colonialists, towards one of supporting the economic interests of the elites in the United States and abroad. It was the first coup in which America overthrew a democratically elected government, but hardly the last, with Guatemala and Chile to come, not to mention some not so democratic ones, like Vietnam and the Congo. Is it any wonder that the residents of the Middle East are skeptical of the neo-cons claims that one of the reasons we invaded Iraq was to transform the countries of the Middle East into democracies? And Kinzer builds very plausible links between this coup and the events of 9-11. In terms of the history that is not known, I actually watched a Fox News anchor interview the son of the Shah, and with a classic patronizing colonialist mindset, asked if the Iranian people were "ready" for democracy yet? Naturally no mention of the fact that they had a democratic government 60 years ago, and America overthrew it in favor of the Shah's dictatorship. The epilogue is also well-done, covering Kinzer's visit to Mossadegh's home village in 2002. With Kinzer's meticulous research I was surprised that he did not mention that Kermit Roosevelt was used as a model for Alden Pyle, in Graham Greene's classic book on Vietnam, "The Quiet American." The mindset that traveled from the Middle East to Vietnam and back again. What would be the opinion of the American people if Iran had interfered in our affairs, organizing riots in our country, bribing leaders, and overthrowing the democratically elected government of Dwight D, Eisenhower, all so that they could enjoy cheaper wheat? Should be required reading in every current American history course, making "the history that we did not know" available to the students, as well as their parents.

I recommend this book to anyone who wants to understand modern Iran and it's hardened and complicated relationship with the U.S.

Well written a master piece of History!

1953年に起こったイランのモサデク政権転覆クーデターは、CIA主導の秘密工作のうち最も有名な事件の一つであり、現在に至るもその悪影響を引きずっている。本書はモサデクの人物像を中心に、19世紀以来のイラン現代史、とりわけクーデターに至る経緯を描き出した歴史ノンフィクションである。 首相に就任したモサデクはイギリス資本の石油会社国有化を宣言、交渉が行き詰る中、英米側は彼の存在そのものが邪魔だと判断。CIAの工作員カーミット・ローズヴェルトの暗躍により、軍事クーデターでモサデクは逮捕された。アメリカはシャーの専制政治に肩入れした結果、イラン国民の反米感情を高めてイスラム革命を招き、さらには中東全体を不安定化させてしまったという歴史の連鎖が指摘される。

I found this book to be a very well researched and written account of the deplorable events involving the Anglo Iranian Oil Company and the overthrow of Iran’s Mossadegh Government in 1953. The author provides a good insight to the development of Iranian attitudes and provides a clear historical background to the climactic event of the overthrow. The author also addresses all the key issues and provides thoughtful observations. I happily recommend this book to anyone seeking a thorough understanding as to why Iran hates the West. This is a story of the exploitation of an undeveloped country. It is also the story of mis-use of power and duplicity at the highest level of American and British Governments. Why would America and Britain expect to be trusted by anyone in the future?

Ce livre donne une petite introduction à l'istoire récente d'Iran. C'est écrit dans une perspective iranophile assumée et justifiée explicitement dans une introduction qui donne une petite perspective historique et culturelle. Ensuite, le gros du livre est consacré à la description des actions des services secrets américains et anglais aboutissant au renversement du gouvernement démocratiquement élu de Mohamed Mossadegh, et à l'installation du régime autoritaire du shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. Connaissant un peu l'histoire, j'ai surtout apprécié la description détaillée des actions de Kermit Roosevelt (agent américain). Mais mon épouse a vraiment apprécié l'ensemble, qui est une excellente introduction à ce chapitre d'histoire.